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Abstract
We consider a setting in which two firms first choose equity positions in each other’s
stock (cross holdings) and then compete in an imperfect product market.  We
demonstrate that cross holdings lead to higher firm profits and higher consumer surplus
when the competitors’ products are complements.  We find that cross holdings lead to
lower firm profits and higher consumer surplus when the products are substitutes.  This
finding is in contrast to the existing literature which establishes that cross holdings leads
to higher firm profits and to lower consumer surplus. The contrasting results emerge
because we solve for optimal cross holdings, whereas the existing literature considers
exogenous cross holdings.  In addition, allowing optimal cross holdings improves
economic welfare. Furthermore, we demonstrate that cross holdings deter entry when
the products are substitutes and facilitate entry when the products are complements.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of cross holdings in non-voting stock among firms
competing in imperfect product markets, where cross holding is defined as one firm’s
equity position (long or short) in another firm.  Such cross holdings without voting rights
arise in several industries.  For example, on January 27, 1998, Northwest Airlines paid
$500 million in cash and stock for a 14% equity position in Continental Airlines while
relinquishing the associated voting right.  Similarly, on August 6, 1997, Microsoft
announced the purchase of $150 million of non-voting preferred stock of Apple Computer.
Microsoft also held a 10% position in RealNetworks since July 1997 but announced
selling off these shares because their products are no longer compatible.1
In this paper we demonstrate that when the firms’ products are complements,
optimal cross holdings entail long positions in the rival’s equity.  This finding is consistent
with the cross holdings between Northwest Airlines and Continental Airlines for two
reasons.  First, these two airlines produce complementary products because they overlap
on only eight routes worldwide.  Second, although the airline industry does compete on
prices, a huge capital investment is required (in airplanes) which implies that Cournot
competition is appropriate, see Kreps and Scheinkman [1983].  We also consider the
effect of cross holdings on industry structure and demonstrate that prohibiting cross
                                           
1 See Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1998.  Microsoft also purchased 5% of the shares in VDO Net
Corp., see Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1997.  Likewise, in the liquor industry, Guiness (UK) and LVMH
Moet Henessy Louis Vuitton (France) held a 24 percent stake in each other’s equity in 1988 (see House
[1994]).  In the telecommunications industry, Telefonica de Espana (TE) holds a 3.5 percent stake in
Portugal Telecom who has the option on a 5% stake in a unit of TE (see Nairn [1998] and Wall Street
Journal, March 3, 1998).
2holdings decreases the likelihood of entry, decreases firm profits, and decreases
consumer surplus when the products are complements. 2
We consider a sequential game where two managers first choose a level of cross
holding and then compete in a Cournot duopoly.  First, we find that when the products are
complements the resulting product market equilibrium exhibits higher quantity, lower
price, higher profits, and higher consumer surplus relative to the situation where there are
no cross holdings. The increased production arises because cross holdings cause the
firm to internalize the positive externality that an increase in its output has on the
profitability of the competitor.  Second, when the products are substitutes the resulting
product market equilibrium exhibits higher quantity, lower price, lower profits, and higher
consumer surplus compared to the equilibrium when cross holdings are zero.  Further,
the interaction between cross holdings and product markets increases economic welfare.
To investigate the robustness of these results to the assumed market structure, we
proceed to consider the scenario in which one firm can enter the monopoly market of
another firm by incurring a fixed cost.   We find that prohibiting cross holdings decreases
(increases) the probability of entry when the products are complements (substitutes).
Hence, the previous results are robust in the case of complements.  However, when the
products are substitutes cross holdings deter entry, that is, restrictions on cross holdings
increase competition ex ante but decrease competition after market structure has been
settled.
                                           
2 The Justice Department has initiated a review of Microsoft’s transactions to ensure their compliance with
antitrust laws.  The results of our model apply to the investment strategy of Microsoft if the products of Apple
and Microsoft are complements.  This would suggest that the concern of the Justice Department may not be
warranted.
3Previous papers consider cross holdings when the products are substitutes.3
Reynolds and Snapp [1986] and Farrell and Shapiro [1990] compare the product market
equilibrium of no cross holding for either firm to the simultaneous deviation of both firms
to positive cross holdings.  They find that when a firm has a long equity positions in the
competitor and the products are substitutes, the result is less quantity produced, higher
price, higher profits for both firms, and lower consumer surplus relative to the product
market equilibrium obtained when there are no cross holdings.  This, however, is not a
Nash equilibrium in cross holding choice.  For instance, if one firm unilaterally deviates
from positive cross holding to zero cross holding it will increase its profits.  Farrell and
Shapiro [1990] also demonstrate when a firm would voluntarily increase its equity
holdings in a rival, assuming that the firm has an initial equity position.  If the firm
increases this equity position, then own profitability goes down, but the firm makes a
profit on the initial exogenous cross holdings since the rivals firm’s profitability
increases.  The firm will want to increase its holdings if the profit on the initial position in
the rival’s stock out weights the loss on own profits.  We demonstrate below, however,
that if both firms start without cross holdings, then neither firm will want to increase to
long equity positions in the setting considered in Farrell and Shapiro.  Thus, their
conditions under which a firm will want to increase cross holdings are driven entirely by
the assumed initial cross holding position.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 introduces the general model and
characterizes the incentives for cross holdings given no initial equity position in the rival.
Section 3 presents closed form solutions for firm profitability, consumer surplus, and
                                           
3  See, among others, Flath (1991).
4economic welfare when the demand curve is linear.  Section 4 endognizes the market
structure by considering the effect of restrictions on cross holding on the likelihood of
entry.  Section 5 summarizes the findings of the paper.
2. The Model
Two all-equity firms, denoted by i and k, produce differentiated products and
compete in a two-stage game without uncertainty.  In the first stage the firms
simultaneously choose a position (long or short) in the rival’s equity correctly anticipating
that cross holdings affect the quantity decision that occurs in stage two.  In the second
stage the firms face Cournot competition, that is, firm managers simultaneously choose
quantities.  At each stage, firm managers make decisions that maximize the equity value
of the firm.4  We assume that prior to the second stage firm managers observe the cross
holdings from the first stage and solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Operating Profit and Assumptions
In the first stage each firm can choose to take a position in the rival’s equity.  Let αi
(αk) denote equity position of firm i (k) in its competitor.  Except when explicitly stated, all
assumptions are symmetric and we perform analyses only with respect to firm i.  These
positions are disclosed and the shares are purchased or sold in a competitive, full
information capital market, so there is no profit or loss associated with the firm’s equity
position.  We abstract from the control rights of (long) equity positions and consider only
                                           
4 We assume that firms have no debt, and ignore any moral hazard problem that can arise through a
shareholder - manager conflict.  Thus, maximizing share value is commensurate to maximizing firm value.
5silent interests.  Without loss of generality, we ignore discounting which ensures that the
value of the equity position at the end of the game will equal the purchase price of the
position in the first stage.  These assumptions allow us to focus on the strategic effect of
the equity position on the product market; that is, the only reason for equity positions in
our model is their effect on both firms’ quantity choice in the product market.
In the second stage the firms play a Cournot game choosing quantities produced,
qi and qk.  At the end of the second stage revenues are determined and profits are
realized.  Each firm has access to a technology for production with total cost Ci(qi)>0.
The production revenue for firm i, denoted Ri(qi,qk), is assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable.  It is assumed the firms’ marginal revenues are decreasing. The following
assumption on Ri is maintained throughout (the subscripts i and k denote the derivatives
with respect to qi and qk respectively):
(1) Rii < 0
We consider two cases of possible interaction between the products.  In the first case the
products are complements, that is, an increase in qk causes an increase in total revenue
and marginal revenue for firm i.  In the second case the products are substitutes, that is,
an increase in qk causes a decrease in total revenue and marginal revenue for firm i.
These assumptions are summarized with the following equations:
Case 1 (Complements):
(2a) Rik > 0
(2b) Riik > 0
                                                                                                                                            
Although we consider only two firms in the model, the results generalize to industries with many firms quite
6Case 2 (Substitutes):
(2a’) Rik < 0
(2b’) Riik < 0
The strategy of each firm consists of a position of cross holding for the first
stage, and a quantity for the second stage which is a function of the equity positions
chosen during the previous stage. Using subgame perfect equilibrium ensures that in
the first stage, each firm makes the equity position decision correctly anticipating the
rival’s equity choice and the corresponding equilibrium outcome of the product market
stage.  Equilibrium strategies are determined using backward induction; thus, we first
establish the firms’ optimal quantity decisions given each possible level of cross
holdings, and then solve for optimal cross holdings.
2.2 Product Market Equilibrium
In the product market, firms choose quantities simultaneously taking the equity
positions of both firms, αi and αk, as given.  Each firm chooses a quantity to maximize
the value to its shareholders.  The shareholders of firm i receive all the operating profits
of firm i plus αi of the operating profits of firm k.  Let πi = Ri(qi,qk) – Ci(qi) represent the
operating profits of firm i.  Firm i’s total shareholder value, Vi, is
(3) Vi = πi + αiπk.
Firm i chooses its quantity to maximize equation (3).  The first order condition which
must be satisfied for firm i is:
(4) 0 = Vii = πii + αiπki = Rii(qi,qk) – Cii(qi) + αiRki(qi,qk).
                                                                                                                                            
naturally, provided each firm has some degree of market power.
7The second order condition that must be satisfied to insure an interior maximum is
Viii<0.  In addition we need the following assumption to assure existence and stability of
the Nash equilibrium:5
(5) Vkkk Viii - Viik Vkki > 0.
Theorem 1: For complementary (substitute) products, an increase in αi causes an
increase (decrease) in q.i
Theorem 2: Consider a firm without cross holdings. If the products are complements, an
increase in αi causes an increase in qk if and only if Riki + αiRkki > 0.  If the products are
substitutes, then an increase in αi causes an increase in qk if and only if Riki + αiRkki < 0.
Proof.  See Appendix.
Theorem 1 states how the product market equilibrium is affected by a change in
one firm’s equity position.  The impact of a change in cross holdings on the product
market depends on whether the products are substitutes or complements.  When firm i
increases its cross holding, αi, the firm increases its emphasis on the profits of the rival
when making output market decisions.  When the products are complements then firm i
will want to increase its quantity, which also has a positive effect on the profits of firm k.
Firm k will either increase or decrease quantity depending on the sign of Riki + αiRkki.
Note that if αi > 0 then the term Riki + αiRkki will be positive and an increase in αi
 will lead to an increase in qk.
When the products are substitutes an increase in αi will lead firm i to decrease its
quantity, which has a positive effect on the profits of firm k.  Again the reaction of firm k
to an increase in αi depends on the sign of Riki + αiRkki.  If Riki + αiRkki is negative then
                                           
5 This is a common assumption for these models, see Brander and Lewis [1986].  Intuitively this assumes
that when a firm changes its own quantity this has a larger effect on the firm’s value than when the
competition changes its quantity.
8an increase in αi leads firm k to increase its quantity.  Note that this is true when αi is
close to zero.  In section 3 we show that when demand is linear and marginal cost is
constant then Riki + αiRkki > 0 if the products are complements and Riki + αiRkki < 0 if the
products are substitutes.
2.3 Equity Market Equilibrium
Prior to the product market stage, both firms are allowed to trade in each other’s
stock.  Each firm chooses an equity position in the rival firm simultaneously.  These
positions are announced and procured in a competitive capital market.  Each firm
chooses its equity position, correctly anticipating the choice of the rival firm and with full
knowledge of how the two equity positions chosen will affect the product market
decision of each firm.  At this stage, total shareholder value is the sum of the operating
profit of the firm and the net revenue from purchasing the fraction α of the counterpart
firm’s operating (i.e., the profits less the cost of acquiring the equity position).  Put
formally,
(6) Vi = πi + ( αiπk - Cost of equity position).
Recall that the cost of acquiring the equity position is equal to the second stage payoff
of the equity position, because there is no uncertainty, no discounting, and investors
have rational expectations.6  Thus, in the first stage, the firm chooses its equity position
to maximize operating profits:
(7) Vi = πi = Ri(qi,qk) – Ci(qi)
The first order condition for firm i is:
9dVi/dαi = (dRi/dqi)(dqi/dαi) + (dRi/dqk)(dqk/dαi) - (dCi/dqi)(dqi/dαi) = 0.
This can be rewritten as:
(8) dVi/dαi = [(dRi/dqi) - (dCi/dqi)] (dqi/dαi) + (dRi/dqk)(dqk/dαi) = 0.
In general we cannot determine the extent of cross holding (long or short) from the
above first order condition.  We can, however, show that when the products are related
then either firm having zero cross holding is not optimal.
Theorem 3: Given no cross holdings, each firm manager has an incentive to take a long
(short) position in the competitor if the products are complements (substitutes).
Proof.  See Appendix.
This suggests a new rationale for short selling since previous explanations rely on
information based trading as in, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia [1987],
Committee on Government Operations [1991], and Hansen and Lott [1995].
3. Linear Demand Example
In this section we derive the closed form solution to the game assuming constant
marginal cost, C, and the following inverse demand function for firm i:
pi = A – qi – Bqk
where pi is the unit price for firm i’s product and A and B are constants.  A captures the
general level of demand in the market, and B characterizes the relation between the
firms’ products.  We assume that |B|<1 which means that a change in the firm’s own
output has more effect on the price the firm receives than a change in the competing
firm’s output.
                                                                                                                                            
6 See Grossman and Hart [1980].
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3.1 Product Market Equilibrium
From the first order condition of equation (4) we derive the following reaction curve for
firm i:
qi = 
2
kBq)+(1-
2
C)-A( iα .
Solving the two corresponding reaction functions simultaneously yields the optimal
quantity as a function of each firm’s equity position:
(9) qi = 
]B)1)(1(4[
B])1(-C)[2-A(
2ki
i
αα
α
++−
+ .
The second order conditions for an optimum holds.
Corollary 1: If the products are substitutes, then an increase in αi causes a decrease in
qi and an increase in qk.  If the products are complements, then an increase in αi
causes an increase in qi and an increase in qk.
Corollary 1 illustrates Theorems 1 and 2.  In particular, when the products are
substitutes (B>0) then firm i will want to decrease its quantity, which has a positive
effect on the profits of firm k (see Figure 1).  Likewise, when the products are
complements (B<0) then firm i will want to increase its quantity, which also has a
positive effect on the profits of firm k (see Figure 2).  In both cases the added
profitability of firm k will induce it to increase its quantity.
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3.2 Equity Market Equilibrium
In the first stage, each firm manager chooses the equity position to maximize operating
profits, anticipating correctly that in stage 2, the quantity that each firm chooses will
satisfy equation (9).  Substituting equation (9) and the corresponding optimal quantity
for firm k into equation (7), taking the first order condition and solving, yields the
following reaction function for equity position:
(10) αi = 
)B+B2()B+B24(
B)B2)(+(1
22 k
k
α
α
++−
− .
Solving the two corresponding reaction functions simultaneously yields the optimal
equity position for each firm.7
Theorem 4: In equilibrium, the optimal amount of cross holding is αi =
−
+
B
B2
 and each
firm produces qi = (
(
A - C)[2 +B]
B)4 1+
. Furthermore, ,0,0 <<
dB
dp
dB
dq ii  and .0<
dB
d iπ
Recalling that |B|<1, it follows immediately from Theorem 4 that if the products are
complements (B<0) then the optimal level of cross holdings consists of a long position
in the competitor’s equity.  Likewise, if the products are substitutes (B>0) then the
optimal level of cross holdings consists of a short position in the competitor’s equity.
Our result is in contrast to Flath [1991] who precludes short selling and therefore finds
no strategic role of cross holdings under Cournot competition with substitute products.
Note that as the degree of substitution increases, the quantity increases, and prices
and firm profits decrease.
                                           
7 This results in a second order polynomial with two roots where the second root, αi=(2/B)-1, is a
minimum.
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Past literature has only examined consumer surplus for exogenous cross
holdings.  We now examine the welfare properties associated with optimal cross
holdings.
Theorem 5: Firm profits are lower when cross holdings are allowed if and only if the
products are substitutes.  Furthermore, consumer surplus and economic welfare are
higher when cross holdings are allowed than when cross holdings are prohibited.
Proof.  See Appendix.
Theorem 5 demonstrates that regulatory restrictions on cross holdings may decrease
consumer surplus and economic welfare.
4. Cross Holding and Entry
We now examine how cross holding affects the entry decision.  Assume that firm
i is the incumbent in the market.  Firm k has the ability to enter the market, but must pay
a fixed cost E.  E is a random variable, drawn from the cumulative distribution function,
F(E), which is common knowledge.  Firm i does not know the entry costs, E, but firm k
will know E prior to making its entry decision.  For simplicity, we ignore the possibility of
other entrants.  If firm k does not enter, then firm i is a monopolist in the product
market.  If firm k enters then the firms compete through Cournot competition in the
product market.  Maintaining the assumptions of section 3, both firms are assumed to
have constant marginal cost, C, and face the same linear demand curve if they are
active in the product market.
Hansen and Lott [1995] also consider how cross holdings affect entry.  They
demonstrate that a firm considering entering a new market can benefit from cross
13
holding positions in the incumbent firm because the entrant has private information
about its own entry decision.  If stock prices are not fully revealing the entrant gets
positive trading profits from taking a short (long) position when deciding to enter (not
enter).  In contrast, our cross holding positions are not information based and decrease
firm profits.
4.1 Equilibrium Without Cross Holdings
First we consider the entry decision and resulting product market decisions when
cross holding is prohibited.  In this situation the game proceeds as follows:
1. Firm k learns E.
2. Firm k decides to enter or stay out.
3. Firm i and firm k (if entered) chose quantity simultaneously.
4. Profits are realized.
First consider the case where firm k does not enter.  In this situation, firm i is a
monopolist with inverse demand of:
pi = A – qi
and constant marginal cost, C.  The well known solution for the product market involves
firm i producing qi = ½(A-C).  Profits for firm i are [½(A-C)]2.  Next consider the product
market result if firm k enters.  This situation is identical to the linear demand example
above, with αi = αk = 0.  The quantity for firm i can be determined by substituting αk = 0
into equation (3), which yields: 


+
−
=
B
CAqi
2
0  and firm k produces the same quantity due
to the symmetry of this case.  The prices for firm i is ( ) 


+
−
+−=
B
CABApi
2
10 and firm k
14
receives the same price.  The profits (excluding entry cost for firm k) for each firm are
B]2[
2
C)-(A 2
+
.
We can now take a step back and look at the entry decision of firm k.  If firm k
does not enter it will receive profits of zero.  If firm k does enter it will receive total
profits of E−
+B]2[
2
C)-(A 2
.  Thus, firm k will enter whenever 
B]2[
2
C)-(A 2
+
<E , and the
probability of entry is 





+B]2[
2
C)-(A 2
F .
4.2 Equilibrium With Cross Holding
If cross holding is allowed we now assume that prior to the product market
decision both firms can choose to take an equity position (long or short) in the rival.
The game now proceeds as follows:
1. Firm k learns E
2. Firm k decides to enter or stay out
3. Firm i and k choose cross holding simultaneously
4. Firm i and firm k (if entered) choose quantity simultaneously
5. Profits are realized.
If firm k does not enter the product market results are the same as above.  In addition,
since we have perfect capital markets there are no incentives for either firm to go long
or short in the equity of the competition in stage 3.  This means firm i will realize the
monopoly profits, and firm k will receive zero profits.
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If firm k enters the resulting equity market and product market equilibrium is
given by Theorem 4.  This yields profits (net of entry costs) of 
2(A - C) [4 - 2B ]
B)16 1( +
 for each
firm.  Going back to the entry decision, firm k will receive total profits of zero it the firm
stays out of the market and total profits of E−
+ B)1(16
]B2-[4C)-(A 2  if the firm enters the
market.  This means the firm will enter the market if 
B)1(16
]B2-[4C)-(A 2
+
<E  and the
probability of entry is 





+ B)1(16
]B2-[4C)-(A 2F .
Theorem 6: If the products are complements (substitutes) then the ability to cross hold
increases (decreases) the probability of entry.
Proof.  See Appendix.
The intuition of theorem 6 is straight forward.  If the products are substitutes then
if cross holding is allowed there will be lower profits for each firm in the product market.
Because of lower profits in the product market, entry is less attractive relative to the
case when cross holding is prohibited.  However, if the products are complements then
the allowance of cross holding increase firm profits in the product market.  This makes
entry more likely when products are complements if cross holding is allowed relative to
when cross holding is prohibited.  This illustrates how cross holdings can affect industry
structure.
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5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the incentives and consequences of corporations’ trading in
the equity of their rivals.  We add to the existing literature in several ways.  First, we
analyze cross holding for companies that produce both complementary and substitute
products.  Second, we analyze both short and long equity positions.  Third, we fully
endogenize the cross holding choice and analyze the optimal cross holding conditional on
the type of competition.  This analysis reveals a new role for short selling, where short
selling can be used to commit a firm to an aggressive product market stance.  Fourth, we
analyze how optimal cross holdings affect consumer surplus and economic welfare.  We
find that when firms engage in optimal cross holding behavior, both consumer and
economic welfare can improve, even though firm profits decrease when the products are
substitutes.  Finally, we investigate the effect of cross holdings on entry.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2:
Totally differentiate equation (4) and the corresponding first order condition for
firm k with respect to qi, qk, and αi.  This gives the following equations:
Viiidqi + Viikdqk + Viiα(i) dαi = 0
Vkki dqi + Vkkk dqk + Vkkα(i) dαi = 0.
Note that Vkkα(i) = 0, so the equations simplify to:
Viii dqi + Viik dqk + Viiα(i) dαi = 0
Vkki dqi + Vkkk dqk = 0.
Solving these equations simultaneously gives:
(A1) dqi/dαi = - Vkkk Viiα/H
(A2) dqk/dαi = Viki Viiα/H
where H = Vkkk Viii - Viik Vkki. Note that H>0 by assumption and that Vkkk < 0 by the
second order condition.
Lets now examine the situation when the products are complements.  First we
determine the sign of (A1).  Since H>0 by assumption, and Vkkk < 0 by the second order
condition, the sign of (A1) is the same as the sign of Viiα.
Viiα = Rik > 0 by assumption (2a).
Thus, (A1) = dqi/dαi > 0.  Next we determine the sign of (A2).  Again, A>0 by
assumption, and we now know that Viiα>0.  Therefore, the sign of (A2) is determined by
the sign of Viki.
(A3) Viki = Riki + αiRkki
Thus, if Riki + αiRkki > 0 then dqk/dαi > 0 and if Riki + αiRkki < 0 then dqk/dαi < 0.
Next we consider the situation when the products are substitutes.
First we determine the sign of (A1).  H>0 and Vkkk < 0 as before.  However, Viiα = Rik is
now negative.  This means that the sign of (A1) will be negative.  Second, we consider
the sign of (A2).  We know that H>0 and Viiα < 0.  Thus, the sign of (A2) is the opposite
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sign of Viki = Riki + αiRkki.  Therefore, if Viki = Riki + αiRkki < 0 then (A2) is greater than
zero, and if Viki = Riki + αiRkki > 0 (A2) is less than zero.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3:
To show this we examine the situation when a firm has zero cross holding (i.e., αi = 0).
If the products are complements we know that dqk/dαi > 0 from theorem 1 and Rik > 0
by assumption.  In addition, we know that Rii(qi,qk) – Cii(qi) = 0 from equation (4).  This
means that equation (7) when αi = 0 reduces to:
dVi/dαi = (dRi/dqk)(dqk/dαi) > 0.
This means the firm can increase its shareholder value by increasing its cross holdings
from zero (i.e., by taking a long position in the competitor).
When the products are substitutes and αi = 0, we know that dqk/dαi > 0 from
theorem 1 and Rik < 0 by assumption.  In addition, we know that Rii(qi,qk) – Cii(qi) = 0
from equation (4).  This means that equation (7) when αi = 0 reduces to:
dVi/dαi = (dRi/dqk)(dqk/dαi) < 0.
This means the firm can increase its shareholder value by decreasing its cross holdings
from zero (i.e., taking a short position in the competitors stock).
PROOF OF THEOREM 5:
First, we solve the model for the case where no cross holdings are allowed, that
is, αi = αk = 0, indexing the corresponding equilibrium values by superscript 0.
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Substituting into equation (3) yields the quantity 


+
−
=
B
CAqi
2
0  and price
( ) 


+
−
+−=
B
CABApi
2
10 .
Second, we prove that prices are always lower or, equivalently, quantities are
always higher, when cross holdings are allowed.
A - (1+B) qk  = pi  <  pi0 = A - (1+B) qk0
⇔
(
(
A - C)[2 +B]
B)4 1+
  = qk  > qk0 = (
[
A - C)
B]2 +
⇔ [2+B]2 >  4(1+B)
⇔ B2 >0
which is true.
Third, we identify sufficient and necessary conditions for firm profits to be higher
when short selling is allowed than when it is prohibited:
2(A - C) [4 - 2B ]
B)16 1( +
  =  πi   >  πi0   = 
2(A - C)
B]2[2+
⇔ (4-B2 )[4+4B+B2 ]  >  16 (1+B)
⇔ 16 + 16B + 4B2  - (4B2  + 4B3+ B4)  >  16 + 16 B
⇔ B2  (4B + B2 )  <  0
⇔ B <  0
Finally, defining Economic Welfare as
( )( ) ( ) iiiiiii qCpqpASW −+−−=+= 0
2
1
π
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where Si is the consumer surplus, we demonstrate that economic welfare is always
lower when firms are precluded from cross holdings, that is, 0ii WW > .
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 002002 1
2
11
2
1 iiiiiiii qCpqBWWqCpqB −++=>=−++
or
( ) ( )[ ]( )
( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
22222
22
1
2
1
116
4
14
21
2
1 



+
−
+




+
−
+>
+
−−
+




+
+−
+
B
CA
B
CAB
B
BCA
B
BCAB
or
[ ] [ ][ ] ( ) ( )BBBBB +++>+−++ 1321162422 2224
or
242 166448246448 BBBBB ++>−++
or
428 BB > .
PROOF OF THEOREM 6:
The probability of entry is higher when cross holdings are allowed than when
cross holdings are prohibited if and only if
[ ]





+
>







+ 2B2
C)-(A 2
B)1(16
]B2-[4C)-(A 2 FF
or, recalling that |B|<1,
[ ] B)1(16B2]B2-[4 2 +>+ .
This reduces to
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- 4B3 - B4 > 0
or B<0.  Likewise, the probability of entry when cross holding is allowed is less than the
probability of entry when cross holding is prohibited when the products are substitutes
(B > 0).
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Figure 1 presents the output market reaction functions for each firm when the products
are substitutes, B>0.  RFk(αk) is the reaction function of firm k, for an arbitrary amount
of cross holding, αk.  Likewise, RFi(αi) is the reaction function for firm i given cross
holdings of αi.  This graph shows how the reaction function of firm i changes when it
increases cross holdings from αi to αi’.  When firm i increases its cross holdings, it
increases the weight it puts on the competitor’s profits when choosing its own quantity.
This causes it to compete less aggressively and moves the output market equilibrium
from E to E’, which results in lower output from firm i and higher output from firm k.
RFk(αk)
RFi(αi’)
RFi(αi)
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Figure 2 presents the output market reaction functions for each firm when the products
are complements, B<0.  This graph shows how the reaction function of firm i, RFi(αi),
changes when it increases cross holdings from αi to α’i.  When firm i increases its cross
holdings it increases the weight it puts on the competitor’s profits when choosing its
own quantity.  When the firms’ products are complements, this causes the firm to
increase its production, which has a positive effect on the rival firm’s profits.  The
equilibrium moves from E to E’ which results in higher output from both firms.
RFk(αk)
RFi(αi)
RFi(αi’)
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